Wilfredo Alberto Trivino-Perez (SBN 219345) wtp@tpalawyers.com
TRIVINO-PEREZ & ASSOCIATES 10940 Wilshire Blvd., 16th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90024 Phone: (310) 443-4251 Fax: (310) 443-4252 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Oscar De La Torre and Elias Serna 6 7 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA **COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES** 10 OSCAR DE LA TORRE and ELIAS **Case No.: 21STCV08597 SERNA** PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO 12 Plaintiffs. **DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE** 13 Date: July 22, 2021 14 Time: 9:15 a.m. Dept. 15 CITY OF SANTA MONICA and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive 15 [Hon. Richard Fruin] 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

As demonstrated by its Demurrer, Defendant seeks judicial notice of not just the existence of several documents, but also the truth of various matters asserted in those documents. While the existence of those documents may be properly subject to judicial notice, the truth of the matters asserted in those documents is not.

The California Supreme Court summarized the relevant principle in *Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057:

While courts may notice official acts and public records, "we do not take judicial notice of the truth of all matters stated therein." [Citations.] "[T]he taking of judicial notice of the official acts of a governmental entity does not in and of itself require acceptance of the truth of factual matters which might be deduced therefrom, since in many instances what is being noticed, and thereby established, is no more than the existence of such acts and not, without supporting evidence, what might factually be associated with or flow therefrom" [quoting and citing cases].

(*Mangini*, *supra*, 7 Cal.4th at 1063-1064, overruled on other grounds in *In re Tobacco Cases II* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276; see also *Searles Valley Minerals Operations, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization* (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 514, 519.)

A few examples are illustrative. Defendant seeks judicial notice for certain testimony of non-party Maria Loya (RJN Ex. G) and attorney billing records attached to a declaration (Exhibit E) in *Pico Neighborhood Association, et al. v. City of Santa Monica* ("Voting Rights Case"). That testimony occurred in this Court and those billing records were filed in this Court, so their existence cannot reasonably be disputed. But that does not mean the truth of that testimony, or the accuracy of those billing records are beyond dispute. As Defendant's Demurrer demonstrates, Defendant is not seeking to rely on merely the existence of that testimony and document, or just that the testimony occurred and the document was filed in this Court. Rather, Defendant's Demurrer relies on the truth of Ms. Loya's testimony (see Demurrer, pp. 2-4) and the accuracy of those billing entries to imply what involvement Mr. de la Torre had in the Voting Rights Case (see Demurrer, pp. 3). In opposing the motion for

attorneys' fees in the Voting Rights Case, Defendant will presumably not want the Court to accept those attorneys' billing records as beyond dispute; they likewise are not subject to judicial notice here.

Defendant also seeks judicial notice of its own meeting minutes (RJN Ex. J), and then attempts to use those meeting minutes as an accurate reflection of everything that occurred in the council meeting (see Demurrer, p. 5). For instance, Defendant's Demurrer claims "the City Council reviewed the staff report" and relies on the meeting minutes to support that assertion (Demurrer, p. 5). Nothing in the meeting minutes states that any of the councilmembers reviewed a staff report. And, even if the minutes did state that councilmembers reviewed a staff report, that would not make it true. The existence of the meeting minutes might be subject to judicial notice, but the facts and characterizations recited in the meeting minutes are not.

Finally, Defendant seeks judicial notice of the staff report prepared by its interim city attorney (RJN Ex. I), and then relies in its Demurrer on the facts and characterizations recited therein (see Demurrer, p. 4). Again, the existence of the staff report may be subject to judicial notice, but the facts and characterizations recited in that staff report are far from being beyond dispute. In fact, many statements in that staff report are demonstrably false. Though not mentioned in the council meeting minutes (RJN Ex. J), Councilmember de la Torre provided an opinion letter prior to the council meeting from another attorney, Dan Ambrose, who explained that Councilmember de la Torre did not have a conflict of interest. Presumably, Defendant would object to this Court taking judicial notice of the veracity and correctness of everything in that opinion letter; its staff report is no different – it is just the opinions and characterizations of an attorney.

Plaintiffs do not dispute the *existence* of the documents and testimony referenced in Defendant's request for judicial notice. But, Defendant requests much more than just acknowledging their existence. Defendant seeks to have this Court take judicial notice of the truth of the matters stated in those documents, and that is not appropriate.

Respectfully submitted: DATED: July 9, 2021 TRIVINO-PEREZ & ASSOCIATES /s/ Wilifred Trivino Perez Wilifred Trivino-Perez Attorneys for Plaintiffs By:

PROOF OF SERVICE 1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 2 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the 3 County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 10940 Wilshire Blvd., 16th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90024. 4 On July 9, 2021, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 5 OPPOSITION TO REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 6 7 on the interested parties in this action as follows: 8 George Cardona Interim Santa Monica City Attorney 9 1685 Main Street, Room 310 Santa Monica, CA 90401 10 **BY MAIL:** I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the persons at 11 the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with our practice for collecting and processing 12 correspondence for mailing. On the same day that the correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a 13 sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid. 14 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 15 Executed on July 9, 2021 at Los Angeles, California. 16 17 18 /s/ Wilifred Trivino-Perez Wilifred Trivino-Perez 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28