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The City of Santa Monica ("Defendant" or "City") answers the Verified Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Oscar de la Torre and Elias Serna (together, "Plaintiffs") as follows:

- 1. In response to paragraph 1, that paragraph states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every allegation.
- 2. In response to paragraph 2, Defendant admits that Plaintiff de la Torre was elected to the Santa Monica City Council ("City Council") as part of the general municipal election held on November 3, 2020; prior to Plaintiff de la Torre's election to City Council, Plaintiff de la Torre served as the party representative for Pico Neighborhood Association ("PNA") in the matter of Pico Neighborhood Association et al. v. City of Santa Monica, L.A. Super. Case No. BC616804 (the "CVRA Action"); that an appeal in CVRA Action is currently pending before the California Supreme Court; and on January 26, 2021, the City Council disqualified Plaintiff de la Torre from participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or decisions relating to the CVRA Action because Plaintiff de la Torre has a common-law conflict of interest. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 3. In response to paragraph 3, Defendant admits that on or around February 4, 2021, the Fair Political Practices Commission ("FPPC") submitted a letter to the City's Interim City Attorney (the "FPPC Letter") and the FPPC Letter speaks for itself. The City denies any characterization of the FPPC Letter that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent

any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.

- 4. In response to paragraph 4, that paragraph states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every allegation.
- 5. In response to paragraph 5, Defendant admits that Plaintiff de la Torre resides in Santa Monica, California; Plaintiff Elias Serna resides in Santa Monica, California; Plaintiff de la Torre was elected to City Council as part of the general municipal election held on November 3, 2020; Plaintiff de la Torre was sworn into office as a Santa Monica City Councilmember on December 8, 2020; and the City Council is comprised of seven councilmembers. Except as expressly admitted, Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny each and every remaining allegation, and, based on that lack of information or belief, denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 6. In response to paragraph 6, Defendant admits that the City of Santa Monica is a charter city existing under the Constitution and operating under the laws of the State of California and the provisions of its Charter. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 7. In response to paragraph 7 to 11, such paragraphs state only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every allegation.
- 8. In response to paragraph 12, Defendant alleges that the Election Code and its legislative history speak for themselves. Defendant denies any characterization of the Election Code or its legislative history that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.

- 9. In response to paragraph 13, that paragraph states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every allegation.
- 10. In response to paragraph 14, Defendant admits that Plaintiff de la Torre was elected to the Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District Board ("SMMUSD") as part of the general municipal election held on November 5, 2002; Plaintiff de la Torre incorporated the Pico Youth & Family Center in or around June 2002; and Plaintiff de la Torre previously served at various time as the director of the Pico Youth & Family Center. Except as expressly admitted, Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny each and every remaining allegation, and, based on that lack of information or belief, denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 11. In response to paragraph 15, Defendant admits that PNA is a non-profit organization and that Plaintiff de la Torre became a member of PNA's board in or around 2005. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 12. In response to paragraph 16, such paragraph states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
 - 13. In response to paragraph 17, Defendant admits that Maria Loya is Plaintiff de la

Torre's wife; Section 600 of its City Charter provides that "City Council shall consist of seven members elected from the City at large"; since Section 600 of the Charter was adopted in or around 1946, members of the City Council have been elected at large; Ms. Loya was a candidate for City Council during the general municipal election held in 2004; as part of the 2004 general municipal election, Ms. Loya received more votes than other candidates for City Council in the Pico neighborhood; as part of the 2004 general municipal election, Ms. Loya was not elected to City Council; and Plaintiff de la Torre encouraged the PNA and Ms. Loya to file the CVRA Action. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.

- 14. In response to paragraph 18, Defendant admits that, on December 15, 2015, Plaintiff de la Torre and Ms. Loya led a rally in support of district-based elections in front of City Hall and that, on or around December 15, 2015, Kevin Shenkman of Skenkman & Hughes PC sent a letter to City Council and the Santa Monica City Manager; and the December 15, 2015 letter from Mr. Shenkman to the City Council and Santa Monica City Manager speaks for itself. The City denies any characterization of the aforementioned December 15, 2015 letter that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
 - 15. In response to paragraph 19, Defendant admits that on April 12, 2016, PNA,

Ms. Loya, and Advocates for Malibu Public Schools filed a complaint against the City in the CVRA Action, styled *Pico Neighborhood Association, et al. v. City of Santa Monica*, L.A. Super. Case No. BC616804 and that the complaint in the CVRA Action speaks for itself. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.

- 16. In response to paragraph 20, Defendant admits that, since the filing of the CVRA Action, the City Council has received public written comment in support of and in opposition to the City's position in the CVRA Action; in 1975 and 2002, Santa Monica voters overwhelmingly voted against amending the City's Charter to adopt district-based elections; the plaintiffs in the CVRA Action introduced a trial exhibit that purported to demonstrate that a majority of a sample of 400 Santa Monica voters would favor district-based elections; the City in the CVRA Action moved in limine to exclude the aforementioned trial exhibit because, among other things, voters' alleged preferences are irrelevant to whether the City's at-large system violates the CVRA and the polling methodology was unreliable; and the aforementioned trial exhibit speaks for itself. The City denies any characterization of the aforementioned trial exhibit that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 17. In response to paragraph 21, Defendant admits that Section 600 of its City Charter provides that "City Council shall consist of seven members elected from the City at large"; since Section 600 of the Charter was adopted in or around 1946, members of the City Council have been elected at large; and, at various time, various City councilmembers have resided in the North

of Montana neighborhood of the City. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.

- 18. In response to paragraph 22, Defendant admits that a bench trial in the CVRA Action was held before Judge Yvette M. Palazuelos between August 1 and September 13, 2018; at the time of the trial in the CVRA Action, Plaintiff de la Torre was an SMMUSD board member; Plaintiff de la Torre testified at trial as the party representative for PNA in the CVRA Action; the plaintiffs in the CVRA Action called at trial Craig Foster, an SMMUSD board member, and Steve Duron, a Santa Monica Rent Control Board member; plaintiffs in the CVRA Action played at trial the video deposition testimony of Tony Vazquez who, at the time, was a City councilmember; and the City in the CVRA Action called at trial Gleam Davis, a City councilmember, Terry O'Day who, at the time, was a City councilmember, and Ana Jara who was appointed to City Council on January 22, 2019. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 19. In response to paragraph 23, the allegations contained therein call for a legal conclusion for which no answer is required; to the extent an answer is required Defendant admits that the plaintiffs in the CVRA Action drafted and filed a proposed statement of decision and judgment, which the trial court adopted and issued on February 13, 2019; the statement of decision adopted by the trial court in the CVRA Action was nearly identical to the CVRA Action plaintiffs' proposal; and the language in the statement of decision and judgment speak for themselves. Defendant denies any characterization of the statement of decision and judgment that is inconsistent with their terms.
 - 20. In response to paragraph 24, Defendant admits that, on February 22, 2019, the City

appealed the judgment in the CVRA Action; on July 9, 2020, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that the City did not violate the CVRA or the California Constitution, awarded costs of appeal to the City, and directed the trial court to enter judgment for the City; on August 18, 2020, the CVRA Action plaintiffs filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court; on October 10, 2020, the California Supreme Court granted the petition for review on the limited question of what a plaintiff must prove in order to establish vote dilution under the CVRA and depublished but did not vacate the Court of Appeal's decision; the appeal before the California Supreme Court is fully briefed as of August 11, 2021; and the California Supreme Court has not yet set a date for oral argument. Except as expressly admitted, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.

- 21. In response to paragraph 25, Defendant admits that various news outlets have published articles on the CVRA Action and the City Council has received public written comment in support of and in opposition to the City's position in the CVRA Action. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 22. In response to paragraph 26, on December 15, 2015, Plaintiff de la Torre and Ms. Loya led a rally in support of district-based elections in front of City Hall; and Plaintiff de la Torre served as the party representative for PNA in the CVRA Action. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.

- 23. In response to paragraph 27, Defendant admits that Plaintiff de la Torre ran for City Council in 2020; Phil Brock, Christine Parra, Mario Fonda Bonardi, and Plaintiff de la Torre referred to themselves as the "Change Slate" during the 2020 election; and a committee called "Santa Monicans for Change 2020 in support of Christine Parra, Mario Fonda-Bonardi, Phil Brock and Oscar de la Torre for City Council" filed an FPPC Form 410 on or around September 10, 2020. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 24. In response to paragraph 28, Defendant admits that Phil Brock, Christine Parra, Mario Fonda Bonardi, and Plaintiff de la Torre each publicly supported as part of their campaign for City Council in 2020 a switch from at-large to district-based elections; and Gleam Davis, Terry O'Day, and Ted Winterer each publicly opposed as part of their campaign for City Council in 2020 a switch from at-large to district-based elections. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 25. In response to paragraph 29, Defendant admits that, on May 25, 2020, George Floyd was killed by Derek Chauvin, a Minneapolis police officer; on May 31, 2021, protests against Mr. Floyd's murder were held in the City; on May 31, 2021, while the protests in the City were ongoing, individuals engaged in looting and violence that resulted in significant damage to stores, restaurants, and vehicles in and around Santa Monica's downtown area and along its

- commercial boulevards; in response to Council direction, the City retained OIR Group to prepare an independent after-action report and evaluation of the events leading to, during, and following May 31, 2020; OIR Group published its report entitled, "Independent After Action and Evaluation Regarding the Events Leading to, During, and Following May 31, 2020" (the "OIR Report"), on or around May 4, 2021; and the OIR Report speaks for itself. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 26. In response to paragraph 30, that paragraph states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every allegation.
- 27. In response to paragraph 31, Defendant admits that the general municipal election was held on November 3, 2020; during the 2020 general municipal election, Gleam Davis, Terry O'Day, Ted Winterer, Ana Jara, and Kristin McCowan were incumbents, as they each had previously been elected or appointed to City Council; as part of the 2020 general municipal elections, there were four councilmember seats with a four-year term open and one councilmember seat with a two-year term open; as part of the 2020 general municipal elections, Phil Brock, Gleam Davis, Christine Parra, and Plaintiff de la Torre were elected as councilmembers to serve four-year terms; as part of the 2020 general municipal elections, Kristin McCowan was elected as a councilmember to serve a two-year term; as part of the 2020 general municipal elections, Terry O'Day, Ted Winterer, and Ana Jara were not elected to City Council; and between the November 1990 and November 2018 general municipal elections, three City councilmembers who were incumbents were not reelected to a successive term. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments

of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.

- 28. In response to paragraph 32, Defendant admits that, on or around November 19, 2020, Plaintiff de la Torre resigned from his position as chair of the PNA board; on December 8, 2020, the City Council adopted a resolution accepting the official canvass for the general municipal election held on November 3, 2020; and, on December 8, 2020, Plaintiff de la Torre was sworn into office as a Santa Monica City Councilmember. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 29. In response to paragraph 33, Defendant admits that, on or around November 25, 2020, Defendant's Interim City Attorney emailed a letter to the FPPC and that the foregoing letter from the Interim City Attorney to the FPPC speaks for itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the foregoing letter from the Interim City Attorney to the FPPC that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically and every remaining allegation.
- 30. In response to paragraph 34, Defendant admits that, on or around February 4, the FPPC submitted a letter to the City's Interim City Attorney; the FPPC Letter is attached as exhibit A to the Second Amended Complaint; and the FPPC Letter speaks for itself. The City denies any characterization of the FPPC Letter that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 31. In response to paragraph 35, Defendant admits that the City Council held a special meeting via teleconference on January 26, 2021 at which the City Council, in a 4-2 vote with one abstention, determined that Plaintiff de la Torre has a disqualifying common-law conflict of interest that prohibited him participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or

decisions relating to the CVRA Action; the record of the proceedings of the special meeting on January 26, 2021 speaks for itself; the City Council held a regular meeting via teleconference on January 26, 2021 at which the CVRA Action was noticed for closed session; and the record of the proceedings of the regular meeting on January 26, 2021 speaks for itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the record of the proceedings of the special and regular meetings on January 26, 2021 that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.

- 32. In response to paragraph 36, Defendant admits that the agendas for the January 26, 2021 special and regular meetings were publicly posted on January 22, 2021; in connection with the January 26, 2021 special meeting, the Interim City Attorney prepared a staff report to City Council; the foregoing staff report and agendas for the special and regular meetings on January 26, 2021 speak for themselves; and Plaintiff de la Torre's written response to the January 26, 2021 staff report was publicly posted, including an opinion letter from an attorney purporting to represent Plaintiff de la Torre. Defendant denies any characterization of the foregoing staff report and agendas for the special and regular meetings on January 26, 2021 that is inconsistent with their terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 33. In response to paragraph 37, Defendant admits that the City Council held a special meeting via teleconference on January 26, 2021 at which City Council determined whether Plaintiff de la Torre has a disqualifying common-law conflict of interest that prohibited him participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or decisions relating to the CVRA Action and that the record of the proceedings of the January 26, 2021 special meeting speaks for

itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the record of the proceedings of the January 26, 2021 special meeting that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.

- 34. In response to paragraph 38, Defendant admits that the City Council held a special meeting via teleconference on January 26, 2021 at which City Council considered whether Plaintiff de la Torre has a disqualifying common-law conflict of interest that prohibited him participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or decisions relating to the CVRA Action; the record of the proceedings of the January 26, 2021 special meeting speaks for itself; and Section 605 of the City's Charter speaks for itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the record of the proceedings of the January 26, 2021 special meeting and Section 605 of the City's Charter that is inconsistent with their terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 35. In response to paragraph 39, Defendant admits that the City Council held a special meeting via teleconference on January 26, 2021 at which City Council considered whether Plaintiff de la Torre has a disqualifying common-law conflict of interest that prohibited him participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or decisions relating to the CVRA Action; the record of the proceedings of the January 26, 2021 special meeting speaks for itself; the City Council received public comment in the form of written comments submitted in advance of the special meeting and oral comments delivered during the special meeting on the agenda item relating to whether Plaintiff de la Torre has a common-law conflict of interest; and the record of

those public comments speaks for itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the records of the proceedings of the January 26, 2021 special meeting and foregoing public comments that is inconsistent with their terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.

- 36. In response to paragraph 40, Defendant admits that the City Council held a special meeting via teleconference on January 26, 2021 at which City Council considered whether Plaintiff de la Torre has a disqualifying common-law conflict of interest that prohibited him participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or decisions relating to the CVRA Action and the record of the proceedings of the January 26, 2021 special meeting speaks for itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the record of the proceedings of the January 26, 2021 special meeting that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 37. In response to paragraph 41, Defendant admits that the City Council held a special meeting via teleconference on January 26, 2021 at which City Council, in a 4-2 vote with one abstention, determined that Plaintiff de la Torre has a disqualifying common-law conflict of interest that prohibited him participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or decisions relating to the CVRA Action; the record of the proceedings of the special meeting on January 26, 2021 speak for itself; the City Council held a regular meeting via teleconference on January 26, 2021 at which the CVRA Action was noticed for closed session; and the record of the proceedings of the regular meeting on January 26, 2021 speaks for itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the record of the proceedings of the special and regular meetings on January 26, 2021 that is inconsistent with their terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied,

each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.

- 38. In response to paragraph 42, that paragraph states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every allegation.
- 39. In response to paragraph 43, Defendant admits that the City Council disqualified Plaintiff de la Torre from participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or decisions relating to the CVRA Action because Plaintiff de la Torre has a common-law conflict of interest and Defendant has not sought an injunction from a court to prohibit Plaintiff de la Torre from participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or decisions relating to the CVRA Action. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 40. In response to paragraph 44, Defendant admits that on February 4, 2021, Plaintiff de la Torre sent an email to the City's Interim City Attorney; on February 4, 2021, the City's interim City Attorney responded by email to Plaintiff de la Torre; the February 4, 2021 email correspondence between Plaintiff de la Torre and the City's Interim City Attorney speaks for itself; the City Council held a special meeting via teleconference on July 22, 2021 at which Plaintiff de la Torre placed a Councilmember Discussion Item on the agenda, which requested the City Council to consider reversing its previous determination that Plaintiff de la Torre is disqualified from participating in, voting, or attempting to influence discussion or decisions relating to the CVRA Action; and the record of the proceedings of the July 22, 2021 special meeting speaks for itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the February 4, 2021 email correspondence between Plaintiff de la Torre and the City's Interim City Attorney and the record of the proceedings of the July 22, 2021 special meeting that is inconsistent with their terms. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or denied, Defendant

denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.

- 41. In response to paragraph 45, that paragraph states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every allegation.
- 42. In response to paragraph 46, Defendant admits on February 23, 2017, PNA and Ms. Loya filed a First Amended Complaint in the CVRA Action; the First Amended Complaint in the CVRA Action speaks for itself; on February 13, 2019; the trial court entered judgment in the CVRA Action; and the judgment in the CVRA Action speaks for itself. The City denies any characterization of the First Amended Complaint and judgment in the CVRA Action that is inconsistent with their terms. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 43. In response to paragraph 47, Defendant admits that the attorneys representing the plaintiffs in the CVRA Action filed a motion and memorandum of costs seeking approximately \$23 million in attorneys' fees and costs; pursuant to an agreement between the parties in the CVRA Action, the City's response to the fee motion and the hearings regarding costs and fees in the CVRA Action have been continued to follow the resolution of proceedings in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court; and in its July 9, 2020 opinion reversing the judgment in the CVRA Action, the Court of Appeal awarded the costs of appeal to the City. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 44. In response to paragraph 48, each and every allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
 - 45. In response to paragraph 49, each and every allegation states only legal theories

and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.

- 46. In response to paragraph 50, Defendants admit that Councilmembers Sue Himmelrich and Phil Brock both currently reside in the North of Montana neighborhood. Except as expressly admitted, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which no answer is required, or Defendant lacks sufficient information to be able to admit or deny such allegations. To the extent a response is required, and, based on that lack of information or belief, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation. To the extent any allegation remains that has not been specifically admitted or specifically and generally denied, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every such remaining allegation.
- 47. In response to paragraph 51, which incorporates by reference allegations contained in prior paragraphs, Defendant incorporates by reference the prior answers to such paragraphs.
- 48. In response to paragraph 52 to 58, those paragraphs state only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every allegation.
- 49. In response to paragraph 59, which incorporates by reference allegations contained in prior paragraphs, Defendant incorporates by reference the prior answers to such paragraphs.
- 50. In response to paragraph 60, Defendant alleges that the Government Code speaks for itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the Government Code that is inconsistent with its terms. Except as expressly admitted or specifically denied, each and every remaining allegation states only legal theories and arguments of counsel to which an answer is not required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant denies generally and specifically each and every remaining allegation.
- 51. In response to paragraph 61, Defendant alleges that the Government Code speaks for itself. Defendant denies any characterization of the Government Code that is inconsistent

1	THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
2	(Estoppel/Waiver)		
3	3. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each		
4	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of waiver		
5	and estoppel.		
6	FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
7	(Unclean Hands)		
8	4. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each		
9	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of unclean		
10	hands.		
11	FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
12	(Failure to Comply with the Ralph M. Brown Act)		
13	5. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each		
14	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, by Plaintiffs' failure to		
15	comply with the Ralph M. Brown (the "Brown Act") act prior to the commencement of this		
16	action, including, but not limited to, the demand to cure and correct procedures required to be		
17	followed under the Brown Act before filing suit herein.		
18	SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
19	(Statutes of Limitations)		
20	6. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each		
21	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statutes		
22	of limitations, including, but not limited to, those set forth in the Brown Act and, specifically,		
23	Government Code Section 54960.1.		
24	SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
25	(Adequate Remedy at Law)		
26	7. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each		
27	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiffs have an		
28	adequate remedy at law for their claims.		

1	EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
2	(Improper Remedy)		
3	8. As a separate and affirmative defense, the claim for declaratory relief is barred, in		
4	whole or in part, because Plaintiffs are seeking to redress past wrongs and/or declaratory relief is		
5	not proper or necessary under Cal. Code of Civil Procedure § 1061.		
6	NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
7	(No Prejudice)		
8	9. As a separate and affirmative defense, assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs are able		
9	to establish a Brown Act violation, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek because they		
10	were not prejudiced by any such violation.		
11	TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
12	(Substantial Compliance with Brown Act)		
13	10. As a separate and affirmative defense, Plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they		
14	seek because Defendant substantially complied with the relevant Brown Act provisions,		
15	including, but not limited to, that the Brown Act does not provide a right of action for members		
16	a legislative body to be present at a closed session. As such, Plaintiffs' requested relief is barred		
17	under Government Code Section 54960.1(d).		
18	ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
19	(Compliance with Authority)		
20	11. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each		
21	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred because at all times relevant hereto, Defendant		
22	proceeded to take action consistent with its legal rights and authority.		
23	TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
24	(Police Power)		
25	12. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each		
26	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred because the conduct of Defendant and its		
27	employees, agents, and officials was at all relevant times herein taken pursuant to the exercise of		
28	legitimate police powers.		

(Lack of Standing)

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13. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiffs lack standing to prosecute this action and/or are equitably barred from prosecuting this action because Plaintiff De La Torre is a City Councilmember, and Plaintiff Serna, a citizen, cannot attend a closed session meeting of the City Council and, for the declaratory relief cause of action, is not the real party in interest.

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Plaintiffs' Own Conduct)

14. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, because any alleged harm to Plaintiffs has been brought about wholly and solely by reason of the acts and conduct of Plaintiffs and without any unlawful or wrongful conduct whatsoever on the part of Defendant. Upon information and belief, such conduct, includes, but is not limited to, a disqualifying conflict of interest under the Political Reform Act, Government Code Section 1090, or the common-law conflict of interest. Plaintiff de la Torre was the designated representative and former co-chair of the PNA, a party to the CVRA Action, and his wife is also a party to that action and a board member of the PNA. Defendant has been awarded costs on appeal in the CVRA Action, and may be able to seek additional costs as a prevailing party from the CVRA Plaintiffs, which includes Plaintiffs de la Torre's wife. Plaintiff de la Torre's wife purports to receive free legal services from counsel who represents plaintiffs in the CVRA Action, and, on information and belief, since taking his oath as a councilmember, Plaintiff de la Torre has received legal advice from counsel who represents plaintiffs in the CVRA Action. In addition, Plaintiff de la Torre, as a City Councilmember, is required to act with disinterested skill, zeal, and diligence in the public interest rather than for personal or private interests and avoid being placed in a position where there may be a temptation to act for personal and private reasons, and therefore Plaintiff de la Torre has a disqualifying common-law conflict of interest. At a minimum, Plaintiff de la Torre's

1	embroilment and personal interest in the CVRA Action—where he helped to draft the complaint,		
2	testified as a party witness, where his wife remains a party and a board member for the other		
3	named party, and where, on information and belief, since taking his oath as a councilmember,		
4	Plaintiff de la Torre has discussed the CVRA Action and this action with counsel who represen		
5	plaintiffs in the CVRA Action—creates the appearance of impropriety or conflict, which shoul		
6	be avoided to insure public confidence. Thus, such conflict requires his abstention from any		
7	attendance and participation in meetings with regard to the CVRA Action, including closed		
8	session meetings with Defendant's counsel. As a result and consequence thereof, Plaintiffs are		
9	barred from any and all recovery and relief.		
10	FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
11	(Justification)		
12	15. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each		
13	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, by because the acts of		
14	Defendant were at all times carried out in the exercise of good faith and with probable cause, ar		
15	were reasonable and justified under the circumstances existing at the time of the alleged		
16	transactions or occurrences. In particular, Plaintiff de la Torres' common law conflict of interes		
17	renders him unable to act with disinterested skill, zeal, and diligence in the public interest with		
18	respect to the CVRA Action, rather than for personal or private interests.		
19	SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE		
20	(Litigation Exception)		
21	16. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each		
22	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, because Defendant		
23	properly conducted a closed session regarding pending litigation, the CVRA Action, in		
24	compliance with the Ralph M. Brown Act, including but not limited to Government Code Section		
25	54956.9, and therefore Plaintiffs cannot state any cause of action based upon a violation of the		
26	Brown Act.		
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	il .			
1	SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE			
2	(Disqualification/Conflict Exception)			
3	17. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each			
4	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, because Defendant			
5	properly conducted a closed session regarding pending litigation, the CVRA Action, in			
6	compliance with the Brown Act, including, but not limited to, Plaintiffs' lack of claim where			
7	disqualifying conflict exists, and therefore Plaintiffs cannot state any cause of action based upon			
8	violation of the Brown Act.			
9	EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE			
10	(Lack of Beneficial Interest)			
11	18. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each			
12	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred, in whole or in part, because at least one			
13	Plaintiff lacks a beneficial interest in the claims asserted.			
14	NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE			
15	(No Attorneys' Fees) 19. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each			
16	and every cause of action alleged therein fails to state a cause of action for which attorneys' fees			
17	may be awarded.			
18	TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE			
19	(Not in Public Interest)			
20	20. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each			
21	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred because the relief sought is not in the public			
22	interest.			
23	TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE			
24	(Balance of Harms)			
25	21. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each			
26	and every cause of action alleged therein fails because the balance of harms does not warrant the			
27	overbroad equitable relief sought.			
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1	TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE	
2	(Violation of Legal Duty)	
3	22. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each	
4	and every cause of action alleged therein fails because the issuance of any declaration or	
5	injunctive relief requiring Defendant to allow Plaintiff de la Torre to attend closed-session	
6	discussions despite the existence of a disqualifying conflict of interest would compel Defendant	
7	to act in violation of its duties under its applicable law, including, but not limited to its Charter	
8	and Municipal Code.	
9	TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE	
10	(Separation of Powers)	
11	23. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each	
12	and every cause of action alleged therein is barred because the relief requested would require the	
13	Court to unconstitutionally intrude into the functions reserved to the legislative branch of	
14	government and would violate the doctrine of separation of powers.	
15	TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE	
1.0	(Additional Affirmative Defenses)	
16	(Additional Affirmative Defenses)	
	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each	
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17 18	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each	
17 18 19	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein is set forth in conclusory and uncertain terms, thereby precluding	
17 18 19 20	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein is set forth in conclusory and uncertain terms, thereby precluding Defendant from fully anticipating all affirmative defenses and/or privileges and immunities that	
17 18 19 20 21	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein is set forth in conclusory and uncertain terms, thereby precluding Defendant from fully anticipating all affirmative defenses and/or privileges and immunities that may be applicable. There may be additional affirmative defenses to Plaintiffs' alleged causes of	
17 18 19 20 21 22	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein is set forth in conclusory and uncertain terms, thereby precluding Defendant from fully anticipating all affirmative defenses and/or privileges and immunities that may be applicable. There may be additional affirmative defenses to Plaintiffs' alleged causes of action that are currently unknown to Defendant. Accordingly, the right to add additional	
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein is set forth in conclusory and uncertain terms, thereby precluding Defendant from fully anticipating all affirmative defenses and/or privileges and immunities that may be applicable. There may be additional affirmative defenses to Plaintiffs' alleged causes of action that are currently unknown to Defendant. Accordingly, the right to add additional defenses, immunities, and privileges is hereby expressly reserved.	
17 18 19 20 21 22 23	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein is set forth in conclusory and uncertain terms, thereby precluding Defendant from fully anticipating all affirmative defenses and/or privileges and immunities that may be applicable. There may be additional affirmative defenses to Plaintiffs' alleged causes of action that are currently unknown to Defendant. Accordingly, the right to add additional defenses, immunities, and privileges is hereby expressly reserved. WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that:	
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein is set forth in conclusory and uncertain terms, thereby precluding Defendant from fully anticipating all affirmative defenses and/or privileges and immunities that may be applicable. There may be additional affirmative defenses to Plaintiffs' alleged causes of action that are currently unknown to Defendant. Accordingly, the right to add additional defenses, immunities, and privileges is hereby expressly reserved. WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that: 1. The Second Amended Complaint be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice;	
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	24. As a separate and affirmative defense, the Second Amended Complaint and each cause of action therein is set forth in conclusory and uncertain terms, thereby precluding Defendant from fully anticipating all affirmative defenses and/or privileges and immunities that may be applicable. There may be additional affirmative defenses to Plaintiffs' alleged causes of action that are currently unknown to Defendant. Accordingly, the right to add additional defenses, immunities, and privileges is hereby expressly reserved. WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that: 1. The Second Amended Complaint be dismissed in its entirety with prejudice; 2. Plaintiffs take nothing by way of their Second Amended Complaint;	

1	pursuant to Government Code Section 54960.5; and		
2	2 5. The Court grant Defendant such other an	5. The Court grant Defendant such other and further relief as it deems proper.	
3		1 1 24 1	
4	4	ly submitted,	
5	5 Interim Cit	AWRENCE y Attorney	
6		estan P. Callor	
7	7 By. <u>/s/ Kt/</u>	esten R. Galler RSTEN R. GALLER Duty City Attorney	
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9	9 CITY OF S	for Defendant SANTA MONICA	
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1 PROOF OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE 2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 3 4 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 1685 Main Street, Santa Monica, California 90401. 5 I hereby state that I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the 6 Court for the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles through First Legal, our Electronic Filing Service Provider, on October 20, 2021 described as: 7 8 DEFENDANT CITY OF SANTA MONICA'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' 9 VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 10 The above document was sent from e-mail address **bradley.michaud@santamonica.gov**. 11 12 All participants in the case listed below are registered eFile users and service will be accomplished through our Electronic Filing Service Provider: 13 14 Wilfredo Trivino-Perez **Trivino-Perez and Associates** 15 10940 Wilshire Boulevard, 16th Floor 16 Los Angeles, California 90024 T: (310) 443-4251 17 F: (310) 443-4252 Email: wtp@tpalawyers.com, wtpesq@gmail.com 18 19 /s/ Bradley Michaud 20 **BRADLEY MICHAUD** 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 26

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

Branch Name: Stanley Mosk Courthouse **Mailing Address:** 111 North Hill Street

City, State and Zip Code: Los Angeles CA 90012

SHORT TITLE: OSCAR DE LA TORRE VS CITY OF SANTA MONICA

CASE NUMBER: 21STCV08597

NOTICE OF CONFIRMATION OF ELECTRONIC FILING

The Electronic Filing described by the below summary data was reviewed and accepted by the Superior Court of California, County of LOS ANGELES. In order to process the filing, the fee shown was assessed.

Electronic Filing Summary Data

Electronically Submitted By: Legal Connect

Reference Number: 4860287_2021_10_21_03_03_13_564_9

Submission Number: 21LA04248618 Court Received Date: 10/20/2021 Court Received Time: 8:28 pm Case Number: 21STCV08597

Case Title: OSCAR DE LA TORRE vs CITY OF SANTA MONICA

Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Case Type: Civil Unlimited

Case Category: Other Complaint (non-tort/non-complex)

Jurisdictional Amount: Over \$25,000 Notice Generated Date: 10/21/2021 Notice Generated Time: 9:45 am

Documents Electronically Filed/Received

Status

Answer Accepted

Comments

Submitter's Comments:

Clerk's Comments:

Electronic Filing Service Provider Information

Service Provider: Legal Connect

Contact: Legal Connect Phone: (800) 909-6859